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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-IMMuNITY FROm SUIT-EERGENCY FLEET CORPORA-
TiON--The plaintiff contracted to furnish certain war supplies to the Emergency
Fleet Corporation, a corporation organized by direction of Congress with stock
completely owned by the United States. Two months after the armistice the
defendant cancelled the remaining shipments under authority of a statute giving
the President or his appointed agent the power to "modify, suspend, cancel, or
requisition any existing or future contract for the building, production, or purchase
of ships or material." Act of June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. at L. 182). The plaintiff
sued for breach of contract, claiming damages for an anticipatory breach. The
complaint was dismissed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed, as the action should
have been brought against the United States for "just compensation." The Buffalo
Union Furnace Co. v. Emergency Fleet Corp. (1923, C. C. A. 2d) 291 Fed. 23.
The Emergency Fleet Corporation is a legal entity distinct from the government,
and is at the same time a war instrumentality of the United States. The fact
that the government is the stockholder does not in itself give such a corporation
an immunity from suit Sloan Shipyards v. Emergency Fleet Corp. (1922) 258
U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386; (1923) 32 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 283. But when the
corporation acts for war purposes as an instrumentality of the government it may
be given special powers. Thus the President delegated to it his power to cancel
contracts. The instant case holds that when this power is exercised by the corpo-
ration as agent for the President, the proper action is against the United States for
"just compensation" as provided in the statute. But this would not include antici-
pated profits as damages. Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States (1923) 261
U. S. 514, 43 Sup. Ct. 428. The war power does not give the corporation authority
to cancel the contracts it makes in a capacity other than that of a war agency.
Such a cancellation is without statutory authority, and renders the corporation
liable as such. Astoria Marine Iron Works v. Emergency Fleet Corp. (1922) 258
U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct 386. Even in that case the United States has such an interest
that the corporation may not be sued in state courts. Southern Bridge Co. v.
Emergency Fleet Corp. (I92o, S. D. Ala.) 266 Fed. 747. For discussions of the
legal status of the Emergency Fleet Corporation see (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
283; (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 218; (I92I) 21 COL. L. REV. 485.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-BLANKET CLAUsE-PREvIoUs NOTE TO THmRD PARTY
DISCOUNTED WITH MORTGAGEE.-The defendant executed a note and chattel mort-
gage to the plaintiff to secure a loan payable in five days. The mortgage contained
a clause constituting it a "permanent and continuing security for all my .... past,
present, and future indebtedness of any nature in favor of said bank, no matter
how the same may arise or may have arisen." When defendant tendered payment
for this note, the bank refused to surrender the mortgage security, claiming that
it secured an earlier note of defendant to a third party, discounted with the bank
and payable a week later. In an action by the bank to foreclose the mortgage,
judgment was given for plaintiff for the amount of the two notes or for the
security. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the judgment be affirmed. First
National Bank v. Pierson (1923, S. C.) 117 S. E. 542.
An early leading case required a strict description of the debt, but there it was
to protect the intervening rights of third parties, and even in such respect it has
now been generally repudiated. Pettibone v. Griswold (1822) 4 Conn. 158; but
see Utley v. Smith (1855) 24 Conn. 290, 314; Clark v. Hyman (1880) 55 Iowa,
14, 26, 7 N. W. 386, 392. The intent of the parties as to what further claims are
to be secured by the blanket clause is determined by reference to the subject matter
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of the debt and the character of the mortgagee. Lamoille County Savings Bank v.
Belden (1916) 90 Vt. 535, 98 Atl. ioo2. Where the mortgagee is a bank of dis-
count and deposit, a clause covering "all indebtedness" is construed to include all
sums due by direct dealings between the parties or by discounts for third parties
of other notes of the mortgagor. Coleman National Bank v. Cathey (1916, Tex.
Civ. App.) 185 S. W. 661; Lamoille County Savings Bank v. Belden, supra. A
similar interpretation is- applied with respect to collateral loan agreements. Nor-
fleet v. Pamlico Insurance & Banking Co. (i912) i6o N. C. 327, 75 S. E. 937;
Commercial & Savings Bank v. Jenks. Lumber Co. (igi, N. D. Ohio) i94 Fed.
732; Stanley v. Chicago Trust & Savings Bank (1896) 165 Ill. 295, 46 N. E.
273. So also where the discounted note matures after the original indebtedness.
Nix v. Hopper (192i) 18 Ala. App. 240, 90 So. 35; contra: Moore v. Terry (I899)
66 Ark. 393, 50 S. W. 998. The result might be different where the mortgagee is
a merchant. Cf. Martin v. Holbrooks (1892) 55 Ark. 569, 18 S. W. 1O46. Parol
evidence in the absence of fraud, mistake, or ambiguity is inadmissible to narrow
the terms of a mortgage expressly stated to be a general security. Davis v.
Carlisle (i9o5, C. C., A. 8th) i42 Fed. io6. However, some courts manifest a
tendency to interpret ambiguous portions of a contract for collateral printed by the
bank in favor of the depositor. Gillett v. Bank of America (1899) i6o N. Y. 549,
55 N. E. 292; Garrett v. Bank of Chelsea (1922) 211 Mo. App. 238, 241 S. W. 87.
But where collateral is pledged with a negotiable note with an agreement that it
shall secure any indebtedness of the maker to the "holder," the provisioh is held to
apply to a transferee of the note. Richardson v. Winnismmet National Bank
(i9o5) i89 Mass. 25, 75 N. E. 97; Mulert v. National Bank of Tarentum (1913,
C. C. A. 3d) 21o Fed. 857. But not where the collateral is to secure other liabili-
ties to the "payee." L. R. A. 1915 F, 968, note. The tendency of the courts is to
give effect to these agreements, which are becoming exceedingly complex in their
endeavor to include every liability. See Ward, American Commercial Credits
(1922) i4o. The instant case further strengthens this growing business practice.
Ackerman v. Hunsicker (I88I) 85 N. Y. 43, 47.
DAmAGEs-PENAL BONDs-DEBT IN ExcEss OF AMOUNT OF PENALTY.-The
defendant purchased land subject to the plaintiff's mortgage which had been
executed to secure a penal bond in the sum of $2,0oo conditioned on the payment
of a $i,ooo debt at the due date. By reason of accrued interest, a sum in excess
of the penalty was in fact due. In an action by the plaintiff to foreclose the mort-
gage, the defendant contended that there could be no recovery beyond the penalty.
The lower court sustained a demurrer to the defense and the defendant appealed.
Held, that the judgment of foreclosure be for the amount due. Platt v. Carroll
(1923, S. C.) ii9 S. E. i8o.
In an action on a bond for the payment of money, whether against the principal
or surety, the prescribed penalty is the limit of recovery except as to interest.
Guffanti v. National Surety. Co. (1922) 234 N. Y. 192, 137 N. E. 22; 2 Sutherland,
Damages (4 th ed. a916) sec. 477; 55 L. R. A. 381, note; Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 1194,
note. The interest is considered as damages for delay in paying the debt. Wyman
v. Robinson (1882) 73 Me. 384. In equity, however, the debt is regarded as the
essential thing. Tazewell v. Saunders (1856, Va.) 13 Gratt. 354. By the minority
view both at law and in equity, the penalty is the limit of recovery. Clarke v.
Seton (i8Oi, Ch.) 6 Ves. 411; People's Savings Bank v. Campau (19oo) 124 Mich.
IO, 82 N. W. 803; I Coote, Mortgages (8th ed. 1912) 82. But this view seems
inconsistent with the general policy of disregarding the penalty. Thus there
-cannot be a recovery for the full amount of the penalty when the real debt with
interest and costs is less. Ford v. Ellison (1921) 287 Mo. 683, 230 S. W. 637; see
Long v. Long (1863) 16 N. J. Eq. 59, 63. In an action on a bond which is security
for the performance of an act other than the payment of money, some states hold
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that the penalty is the limit of recovery. N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 16o; Beers v.
Shannon (1878) 73 N. Y. 292; Louisville & N. R. R. v. United States Fidelity Co.
(1912) 125 Tenn. 658, 148 S. W. 671. Others allow a recovery of actual damages
although in excess of the penalty where the action is on the contract and not on
the bond. Graham v. Bickham (1796, U. S.) 4 Dallas, I49; Cramp & Co. '.
Doughty (1916) 89 N. J..L. 288, 98 Atl. 260. The majority, however, apply the
same rule as to money bonds. Gloucester City v. Eschbach (1892) 54 N. J. 15o.
23 Atl. 360; 87 Am. Dec. 745, note; 2 Sutherland, op. cit. 1569. Where, in addi-
tion to the bond a mortgage is given as security'for the debt, in England as well
as in this country, in an action to foreclose the mortgage, interest may be added
though in excess of the penalty. Clarke v. Lord Abingdon (i8io, Ch.) 17 Ves.
io6; Long v. Long, supra. In England, however, such action must be on the
mortgage, but there seems to be no sound reason for not giving the same result
whether the action is on the mortgage or on the bond. A few cases make an
exception in the case of an agreement to support and allow full recovery of actual
damages, though in excess of the penalty. Meinert v. Bottcher (1895) 60 Minn.
204, 62 N. W. 276; Eugley v. Sproul (1916) n15 Me. 463, 99 Atl. 443. The
instant case followed the correct rul% but the dictum that if the action were on
the bond recovery would be limited to the amount of the penalty is against the
great weight of authority.
EQUITY-REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS-MISTAKE IN RATE By LESSEE IN
ExERCIsE OF OPTION FOR ADDITIONAL SpAc.-The defendant leased floor space
to the plaintiff for ten years, and in addition, the plaintiff was given an option
to lease for the unexpired term any additional space at thirty cents a square foot.
Additional space was leased from year to year at this rate. Later, the plaintiff
wrote a letter to the defendant, requesting a renewal of the additional space
at forty cents a square foot, and the parties entered into a written lease for the
additional space at that rate. After paying rent at the increased rate for some
time, the plaintiff discovered his mistake and brought a complaint for reforma-
tion. Held, that the complaint should be dismissed. Libby, McNeil & Libby v.
Bush Terminal Bldg. Co. (1923, Spec. T.) 121 Misc. 28, 201 N. Y. Supp. 149.
The case seems to be of first impression. Ordinarily, reformation for a
unilateral mistake of fact will be granted if the defendant has been guilty of
fraud. Keister v. Meyers (1888) 115 Ind. 312, 17 N. E. 161; Kilmer v. Smith
(1879) 77 N. Y. 226. Or of "inequitable conduct." Cleghorn v. Zumwalt (i8go)
83 Calif. 155, 23 Pac. 294 (defendant aware of plaintiff's mistake of fact);
Essex v. Day (1885) 52 Conn. 483 (defendant aware of plaintiff's ignorance);
see Abbot, Mistake of Fact as a Ground for Affirmative Equitable Relief (igio)
23 HARv. L. Rav. 608, 618. The true concept of reformation is that a writing
is corrected to evidence the real contract of the parties. 2 Pomeroy, Equitable
Remedies (i9o5) sec. 675. The instant case contains the novel element of a
power in the plaintiff to demand a lease for additional space. Yet the finding
that the plaintiff's only mistake lay "in failing to take advantage of the option"
to renew at thirty cents seems hardly tenable on a fair interpretation of the
facts. It seems that a reasonable man in the defendant's position would have
suspected that the mistake was in the quotation of the price in the writing and
should be deemed guilty of inequitable conduct justifying reformation. Cf.
Tyra v. Cheney (915) 129 Minn. 428, 152 N. W. 835.
INSURANcE-REsERvATION OF PowER To CHANGE BENEFICIARY-RIGHT OF
CREDITOR TO COMPEL INSURED TO SURRENDER POLICY FOR CASH VALuE.-A life
insurance policy gave the insured the power to change the beneficiary, and also
the power to obtain the cash surrender value upon the lapse of one premium.
The wife of the insured was the beneficiary. A judgment was recovered against
326 YALE LAW JOURNAL
the insured, and a receiver appointed. He brought an action to compel the
insured to obtain the cash surrender value. No change of beneficiaries had
been effected. Held, that the action should be dismissed. Maurice, Receiver v.
Travelers' Ins. Co. (1923, Spec. T.) 121 Misc. 427, 2oI N. Y. Supp. 369.
Where there is a bona fide conveyance of property in trust with the reserva-
tion of a power of appointment in the grantor, such power is not available to
creditors of the grantor to defeat the rights of the beneficiaries. Jones v.
Clifton (1879) 10 U. S. 225; Hill v. Cornwall (1894) 95 Ky. 512, 26 S. W. 540;
Perry, Trusts (6th ed. igiI) sec. io4, note I(a). It is generally agreed that a
beneficiary has a vested interest in a life insurance policy upon its execution.
Washington Central Bank v. Hure (1888) 128 U. S. 195, 9 Sup. Ct. 4i; see
Vance, Beneficiary's Interest in a Life Insurance Policy (1922) 31 YALE LAW
JouRNAL,, 343, 344. Where the policy gives the insured the power to change
beneficiaries some courts state that the named beneficiary gets a mere expectancy.
Quist v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. (1922) 219 Mich. 4o6, i89 N. W. 49;
Belzoni v. Hodges (1923, Miss.) 96 So. 97. But by the better view even in such
a case the beneficiary gets a vested interest in ordinary life insurance policies.
Neary v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1918) 92 Conn. 488, io3 At. 66I; see
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Tesauro (1923, N. J. Ch.) 12o Atl. gi8. The
policy is regarded as a declaration of trust, which is binding until the power of
revocation is exercised. See Pingrey v. Nationld Life Ins. Co. (1887) 144 Mass.
374, II N. E. 563. The beneficiary's vested interest is that the terms of the
contract be performed, and any other agreement between insurer and insured
is void as to the beneficiary. Brown v. Life Ins. Co. (1920) 114 S. C. 202, 103
S. E. 555. An assignment to creditors, not in accordance with the terms of the
policy, does not divest the interest of the beneficiary. Douglass v. Equitable Life
Ass. Co. (1922) 15o La. 519, 9o So. 834; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Zgliczenski
(i922, N. J. Ch.) ii 9 Atl. 29. Nor will a creditor's bill lie to reach the cash
surrender value option of the insured. National Bank of Commerce v. Appel
Clothing Co. (I9o5) 35 Colo. I49, 83 Pac. 965. The bankruptcy cases are not
in conflict with this view, as they are based on sec. 70 (a) of the Bankruptcy
Act giving to the trustee all the powers of the insured. See Cohen v. Samnuels
(I917) 245 U. S. 50, 38 Sup. Ct. 36; (igi8) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 403. The
decision in the instant case is sound.
JUDGMENTS-RES ADJUDICATA-REcOVERY UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AcT No BAR TO SuiT UNDER FEDERAL AcT.-The plaintiff's intestate, a train
flagman, was killed in a collision while returning from a haul between two
points in Pennsylvania which had included one interstate car shipment. The
plaintiff sued as administratrix in the federal court under the Employers'
Liability Act, she being also the sole beneficiary. She also instituted suit as
claimant under the Pennsylvania Compensation Act, and recovered judgment.
Held, that as an identity of parties did not exist, and since the injury occurred
in interstate commerce, plaintiff was not barred by the Pennsylvania judgment
from recovering in the federal court. Dennison, Adm'x. v. Payne (June 20, 1923)
U. S. C. C. A. 2d, Oct. Term, 1922, No. 15I.
The doctrine of res adjudicata requires an identity of parties and of cause
of action. The identity of parties is secured where the person or his privy
is acting in the same right, title, or quality. Chand, Res Judicata (1894) 18o;
4 Comyns, Digest (Ist Am. ed. 1825) 201. The fact that the plaintiff is the sole
beneficiary in the actions under both the Pennsylvania and the federal acts
appears to fulfill this first requirement. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry. v. Anderson
(1916) 134 Tenn. 673, I85 S. W. 677; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Wulf (1913)
226 U. S. 570, 33 Sup. Ct. 135. An identity of cause of action exists when the
operative facts on which the remedial right is based, are the same. Phillips,
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Code Pleading (1896) 27, 28, criticising Pomeroy, Code Remedies (3d ed. 1894)
secs. 453, 519; (1923) 32 YAL LAW JOURNAL, 5o6. But the court in the instant
case unsoundly treats its own difference of conclusion of law from that reached
in the other case, as to whether the commerce was interstate or intrastate at
the time, as determining that the causes of action were not the same. The
tendency of the courts to permit an amendment during the trial changing the
legal theory of recovery and therefore changing the nature and sometimes the
extent of the remedial right involved substantiates the proposition that the
operative facts, as opposed to any conclusion of law from these facts, constitute
the "cause of action." Keystone Coal & Coke Co. v. Fekete (1916, C. C. A. 6th)
232 Fed. 72. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Wuif, supra. A similar error is to
treat the term "cause of action" as meaning "right of action." Phillips, loc. cit.
The more carefully reasoned cases hold that though a delict of defendant may
invest the plaintiff or his representatives with an election of several rights of
action, there is but one cause of action. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Oliver (igig,
C. C. A. 5th) 261 Fed. I; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Preston (1918, C. C. A. 3d)
254 Fed. 229. The right of action in the instant case should itself have been
held barred by the state decision, as the Federal Liability Act is essentially a
survival statute and forbids more than one recovery for the same injury. Act
of April 5, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 291). And as the operative facts, and therefore
the cause of action, as well as the parties, are identical with those in the state
court, this was a proper case for the application of res adjudicata.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-DEsTRUCTION OF PREMISES BY FIRE-LIABLITY OF
LEssEE FOR RENT.-The plaintiff leased premises to the defendant for a term of
years and agreed to perform certain personal services as part of the considera-
tion for the rent. During the term the building was destroyed by fire and the
defendant refused to pay rent. The plaintiff brought action for the balance of
the rent. The lower court decided for the defendant. Held, that the judgment
be affirmed. Greenberg v. Sun Shipbuilding Co. (1923, Pa.) 121 At. 63.
At common law a lease operated to convey an estate in the land to the lessee
and destruction of the buildings did not destroy his duty to pay rent Baker v.
Holtzapffel (1811, C. P.) 4 Taunt. 45. In the absence of statute, this is the
weight of authority to-day. I Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant (1912) 1191;
but see Wattles v. So. Onaha Ice & Coal Co. (1897) 5o Neb. 251, 69 N. W. 785.
It is generally held, however, that a lease of an apartment in a building creates
no estate in the land and total destruction privileges the lessee not to pay the
balance of the rent. Taylor v. Caldwell (1863, Q. B.) 3 Best & S. 824; cf.
Norman v. Stark (1922, Tex.) 237 S. W. 963. Certain exceptions alleviating
the harshness of the common law rule, moreQver, seem to be marking a tendency
to apply to leases the same rules in this regard as to ordinary contracts. Thus
where prohibition prevented a sale of liquor on premises leased for that pur-
pose only, the lessee was not liable for the rent. Doherty v. Monroe Brewing
Co. (ig2I, Ist Dept.) 198 App. Div. 7o8, I91 N. Y. Supp. 59; see (921) 30
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 863. Similarly where the lessee was drafted into the army.
State Realty Co. v. Greenfield (192o, Mun. Ct.) IiO Misc. 27o, i8i N. Y. Supp.
511; but see .Afathey v. Curling [1922, H. L.] 2 A. C. i8o. And where the
lessor had failed to insure the destroyed premises as he had convenanted. Witt-
meyer v. Storms (1918, Mo.) 203 S. W. 237. In a lease of land and personalty,
on destruction of the personalty an apportionment of the rent has been allowed.
Richards le Taverner's Case (1544, K. B.) I Dyer, 56 a. Under the strict com-
mon law rule the plaintiff's personal covenants in the instant case would probably
have been regarded merely incidental to the defendant's estate and the defendant
held liable for the whole rent. Lamott v. Sterett (I8oo, Md.) i Har. & J. 42.
Under the more liberal tendency an apportionment of rent might have been
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allowed, based on the relative value of the personal services to be performed
by the plaintiff. Newton v. Wilson (i8og, Va.) 3 Hen. & W. 470. But in hold-
ing the defendant not liable for any of the rent, the court goes the whole way
of treating the lease as an ordinary contract. A later Pennsylvania case, how-
ever, states by way of dictum that the common law rule is still in force in that
jurisdiction. Jacobs v. Mingle (1923, Pa.) x22 Atl. 285, 286. It is difficult to
reconcile that dictum with the actual decision in the instant case.
MumIciPAL CORPORATIONs-STATUTORY LIMITATION ON EXPENDITUREs-APPRO-
PRIATION FOR PUBLIC CEL _BRATIo.-The city of New York appropriated $400,ooo
to be used in celebrating its twenty-fifth anniversary. The plaintiffI a taxpayer,
secured an injunction to restrain the issue of bonds for the $4oo,opo relying on
certain procedural omissions and the provision of the state constitution, that
no city shall incur any indebtedness except for city purposes. N. Y. Const.
(1894) Art. 8, sec. io. The injunction was affirmed by the Appellate Court,
which certified questions to the Court of Appeals. Held, that the procedural
omissions justified the injunction, but that the expenditure was within city
powers. Schieffelin v. Hylan (1923) 236 N. Y. 254, 14o N. E. 689.
The public purpose which supports taxation is not limited to necessities.
Green v. Frasier (ig2o) 253 U. S. 233, 240, 40 Sup. Ct 499, 5O1; COMMENTS
(i918) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 824. Taxation for memorials to arouse patriot-
ism, and for exhibitions at fairs, has been held proper. Tatham v. Philadelphia
(1876, C. P. Pa.) ii Phila. 276; United States v. Gettysburg R. R. (I896) i6o
U. S. 668, 6 Sup. Ct. 427; Parsons v. Van Wyck (igoo, ist Dept.) 56 App. Div.
329, 67 N. Y. Supp. 1054. But the entertainment of official visitors has been
held not such a public purpose. Law v. People (1877) 87 Ill. 385, 402; Austin v.
Coggeshall (1878) 12 R. I. 329. It may be questioned whether this rule would
be followed to-day in view of the practice during the recent war. The tendency
of modern decisions is to treat celebrations of public events as justifiable objects
of public expenditure. Stegmaier v. Georinger (1907) 218 Pa. 499, 67 Atl. 782
(jubilee celebration held a public use) ; Hubbard v. Taunton (i886) 140 Mass.
467, 5 N. E. 157 (small amount for celebrations permitted). Although there
are few decisions in point both the trend of authority and long usage tend to
support the liberal view of the instant case.
PLEAING-JOINDER OF PARrmS IN THE ALTERNATIVE.-Under N. Y. C. P. A.
1921, sec. 209, persons claiming jointly, severally, or in the alternative may be
joined as plaintiffs, if their claims arise out of the same transaction and involve
any common question of law or fact. The maker and payee of a certified
check joined in an action against the bank which had paid it on a forged indorse-
ment The defendant appealed from the ruling of the lower court that there
was no misjoinder of parties. Held, (two judges dissenting) that there was a
misjoinder of parties. Olsen and Irwin vi. Bankers" Trust Co. (1923, ist Dept.)
2o5 App. Div. 669, igg N. Y. Supp. 7oo.
At common law, only persons having a )unity of interest could be joined as
plaintiffs or defendants. Casey Pure Milk Co. v. Booth Fisheries Co. (1913)
i24 Minn. 117, i44 N. W. 450; 5i L. R. A. (N. s.) 64o, note. The English Prac-
tice Rules of i896 provided for such a joinder in all cases involving common
questions of law or fact. THE ANNUAL PRACICr (i896) Rules 1, 4, 7. In the
United States, this rule seems to have been adopted as to joinder of defendants
in five states. Conn. Prac. Book (1922) sec. I55; N. J. Prac. Act, 1912, sec. 6;
N. Y. C. P. A. 192o, sec. 211; R. I. Rev. Sts. i9og, ch. 283, sec. 2o; Wis. Sts.
i919, sec. 26o3; see (i918) 3 HARv. L. REv. 1034. But only two states allow
such joinder of plaintiffs. N. J. Prac. Act, i912, sec. 4; N. Y. C. P. A. i9o,
sec. 209. The New York provision in section 2o9 is taken dirertly from the
English Practice Act. THE ANNUAL PRAcricE (I923) Order XVI, Rule I.
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The consistent English interpretation of this provision has permitted joinder of
plaintiffs whether the causes of action were separate, distinct, or even mutually
destructive. Bedford v. Ellis [igol, H. L.] A. C. I; Thomas v. Moore [1918,
C. A.] I K. B. 555; cf. Payne v. British Time Recorder Co. [igzi, C. A.]
2 K B. I. But the New York legislature, while adopting this English rule, left
operative section 258 of the Civil Practice Act, which in general forbids joinder
of inconsistent causes of action. COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 384.
The instant case falls within the resulting conflict. Apparently relying on the
inconsistent causes of action, the majority follows the old limitations of section
258, and denies joinder of plaintiffs. Yet the same court finds no difficulty in
ignoring section 258 when permitting joinder of defendants under section 211,
which in wording is substantially the same as section 209. Bossak v. National
Surety Co. (1923, ist Dept.) 205 App. Div. 707, 2oo N. Y. Supp. 148; Rothschild,
Simplification of Civil Practice in New York (19;3) 23 COL L. RFv. 618, 633.
It seems unfortunate for simplified practical pleading that the settled English
interpretation was not given to section 2O9, in accordance with the opinion of
the minority.
Pa oPFRTY-DEDIcATIoN-PREsUMPTION oF DEDICATORY INTENT BY LONG PUBLIC
UsFm.-The plaintiff for over forty years allowed children of a school district
to cross his land to and from a school house. The user began when the plain-
tiff's land was unenclosed but continued after he had fenced in his land and
placed gates at both ends. The plaintiff prayed to have the children enjoined
from trespassing over his land. Held, that no injunction be issued, since the
use of this pathway had been dedicated to the school district. Faulkner v. Hook
(1923, Mo.) 254 S. W. 48.
A common law dedication requires an intent to dedicate and an acceptance
by the public. Beatty v. Kurtz (182_9, U. S.) 2 Pet. 566; Tiffany, Real Property
(2d ed. 192o) sec. 482. There may be a dedication to a limited portion of the
public for religious and charitable uses. Wormley v. Worinley (1904) 207 Ill.
41H, 69 N. E. 865 (cemetery); Chapnan v. Floyd (x882) 68 Ga. 455 (school).
Unlike prescription, the theory of a lost grant cannot apply to a dedication as
the beneficiary, the public, is too indefinite a body to be a grantee. See Cincinnati
v. White (1832, U. S.) 6 Pet. 431; Tiffany, op. cit. sec. 480. Mere proof of
user for the statutory period prima facie establishes an easement by prescription.
Pavey v. Vance (1897) 56 Ohio St. 162, 46 N. E. 898. But dedicatory intent
should be required to be unequivocal and manifested by conduct inconsistent
with any other theory of intent. Harris v. St. Helens (I914) 72 Or. 377, 143
Pac. 94. Many courts by confusing dedication with prescription have held
that mere public user for the statutory period raises a "conclusive" presumption
of dedicatory intent Canton Co. v. Baltimore City (19o6) 104 Md. 582, 65 Atl.
324; Locklin v. Tucker (1922) 2O8 Ala. 155, 93 So. 896. Others hold that it
raises a rebuttable presumption. Moragne v. Gadsden (Igii) 17o Ala. 124, 54
So. 518. And still others that it is only evidential of such intent. Vance v.
Pewamo (191o) 161 Mich. 528, 126 N. W. 978; Provident Trust Co. v. Spokane
(I9II) 63 Wash. 92, 114 Pac. 1030. But in all the cases the land has been set
aside for a purpose obviously for the benefit of the public. Moragne v. Gadsden,
supra (park) ; Bloomfield v. Allen (1911) 146 Ky. 34, 141 S. W. 400 (sidewalk).
Where the land alleged to have been dedicated is ar integral part of the owner's
land, as in the instant case, the presumption is that the user was permissive,
and constituted a mere license. West Point v. Bland (19o7) io6 Va. 79, 56
S. E. 8oz; International & Great Northern R. R. v. Cuneo (1907) 47 Tex. Civ.
App. 622, 1O8 S. W. 714. The presumption of a dedicatory intent in the instant
case seems unwarranted, as the plaintiff could not conveniently have left open
his land for himself and his licensees, and have ch 4ed it as to all others.
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PROPERTY-POSSESSIOIN OF GRANTOR AFTER DELIVERY OF DEE1-BoNA FIDE
PURCHASERS FROm GRAxTEE.-The plaintiff deeded his farm to the X company in
part payment for a second farm for which he then received a contract of sale. As
part of the transaction he remained in possession of the former as lessee for a
term of years. Due to the frozen condition of the soil of the second farm, the
plaintiff was forced to rely entirely upon the X company's representations con-
cerning its quality but it was agreed that another inspection should be made the
following June. Shortly after this conveyance the Y company took from the X
company a mortgage on the first farm, but its agent who appraised the premises
failed to inquire of the plaintiff as to his rights. About August I the plaintiff
discovered that the X company's representations as to quality of soil were false
and fraudulent, and sued to compel a reconveyance of the farm and cancellation
of the mortgage. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the relief be granted, as the
Y company having constructive notice of the fraud was not a mortgagee in good
'faith. 1-auger v. Rodgers Land Co. (1923, Minn.) 194 N. W. 95.
A purchaser of real property from the record owner is bound to inquire of any
one in possession as to his possible claim of title. 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d
ed. 1920) 2220. On failure to do so, he is treated as if he had notice of those
facts but only those facts which proper inquiry might have disclosed. Carr v.
Maltby (I9OI) I65 N. Y. 557, 59 N. E. 291. But where the grantor remains in
possession after his grant, many jurisdictions estop him from claiming any interest
as against subsequent bona fide purchasers who fa'l to make such inquiry, on the
ground that his possession may be treated as a mere hold over after the grant
Koon v. Trammel (1887) 71 Iowa, 132; McEwen v. Keary (1913) 178 Mich. 6, 144
N. W. 524; 2 Tiffany, op. cit. 2238. Delivery of the deed does not, however,
necessarily signify an intention on the part of the grantor to part with all equities
in the premises. Many courts, therefore, take the opposite view. Pippin v.
Richards (Ip1) 146 Wis. 69, 13o N. W. 872; Groff v. State Bank (1892) 5o
Minn. 234, 52 N. W. 651. The problem is obviated in the instant case by reason
of plaintiff's status as lessee in the premises. But the Y company took its mort-
gage subject to any equities existing between the plaintiff and the X company
which proper inquiry might have elicited. The court rightly assumes that proper
inquiry might have disclosed the plaintiff's power of rescission. At least, the con-
tingency which would lead to the exercise of that power was in fact contemplated
at the time of contracting. But had the instant case been on6 of simple fraud
undiscovered by the plaintiff when the Y company took its mortgage, undoubtedly
the result reached in the dissenting opinion would be correct Matesky v. Feld-
man (1889) 75 Wis. 103, 43 N. W. 733; Pippin v. Richards, supra.
SALES-CONTRACT TO SELL UNASCERTAINED GooDs-EFFECT OF MERE SprcnClA-
TioN.-Under an executory contract for the sale of sugar to be shipped from Java
during July-August by steamer to be named later, no arrival no sale, the seller
'declared that steamer Chifuku Marti carrying buyer's sugar had sailed. Later,
the Chifuku Maru having been detained, the seller "declared" provisionally that
steamer West Cheswald, carrying the same quality sugar, had been substituted in
fulfillment of the contract and would arrive about the same time. The buyer
refused to accept this sugar on arrival, and sued to recover the amount of two
irrevocable letters of credit, collected by the seller, and representing the price of
the sugar. Held, that the buyer could not recover. Wilbur & Sons v. Lamborn
(1923, Pa.) 12o Atl. 478.
Where there is a specification of the subject matter at the time of making a con-
tract for future sale, a subsequent destruction of the goods will avoid the contract
McMillan v. Fox (1895) 90 Wis. 173, 62 N. W. 1052; Sales Act, sec. 8. But no
title to the goods passes, and replevin will not lie against a subsequent purchaser
RECENT CASE NOTES
from the seller. Kerr v. Henderson (1899) 62 N. J. L. 724, 42 Atl. lO73; Ameri-
can Metal Co. v. Daugherty (1907) 204 Mo. 71, 102 S. W. 538. Nor against the
seller's trustee in bankruptcy. Shaw v. Smith (88o) 48 Conn. 306. Where such
identification takes place after the time of contracting, it has commonly occurred
simultaneously with an appropriation, and the two have often been wholly confused.
Woods v. Russell (1822, K. B.) 5 Barn. & Ald. 942. Such identification apart
from appropriation has, however, been recognized. Laidler v. Burlinson (1837,
Exch.) 2 M. & W. 602; Muchlow v. Mangles (iSo8, Exch.) i Taunt. 318; see
Andrews v. Durant (1854) 1[i N. Y. 35. A requirement of specification within
five days of the particular cargo to be used to fill a contract has been held to go
to the essence. Steinhardt v. Binghan (1905) 182 N. Y. 326, 75 N. E. 403. The
specification in that case, however, would probably have amounted to an appro-
priation as well. But when the contract puts on the seller the obligation to deliver
at destination, specification and appropriation obviously do not coincide. Especially
is this true when the contract provides "no arrival no sale," as the price will not
be due without arrival, and destruction of the cargo or impossibility of performance
will end the seller's duty. McNeal v. Braun (1892) 53 N. J. L. 617, 23 AtI. 687;
Held v. Goldsmith (1923, La.) 96 So. 272. Recent cases present the problem of
the effect of "declaring" a cargo under such a contract, though it will always be a
question whether the "declaration" is made for the purpose of information only
or to invite reliance. The cases to date largely have gone on the ground that the
facts did not present an unconditional declaration. T. Hungerford Smith Co. v.
Lamborn (1923, Spec. T.) 2oo N. Y. Supp. 292; Matthew Smith Co. v. Lamborn
& Co. (1921, S. D. N. Y.) 276 Fed. 325; Mann v. Eastern Sugar & Products Co.
(1923, Mass.) 138 N. t. 244. See also Thornton v. Simpson (i816, Exch.) 6
Taunt 556. They contain, however, some indication that even after such a
declaration, the seller would be empowered to substitute an equivalent cargo in
the event of delay or loss of the cargo originally declared. But this seems to
be limited to a declaration not accepted by the buyer. Cf. Bernardino Correa.
Ltd. v. Porter & Co. (1E923, K. B.) 16 Lloyd's List, i89. As with an appropria-
tion, the buyer's later assent might be immaterial if the declaration exactly con-
formed to the contract. If such substitution be permitted, "the seller could
hold the buyer if the price fell, though the buyer could not hold the seller if
the price rose." Matthew Smith Co. v. Lamborn & Co., su-pra, at p. 326. And
the buyer would be without redress if he were thereby prevented from perform-
ing a contract for resale of the specific cargo declared. See Held v. Goldsmith,
supra. It should therefore be permitted only where the contract is clearly
intended to provide such advantage to the seller.
TRUsTs-DETERMINATIoN-NECESITY OF CONVEYANCE BY TRUSTEE To VEST
LEGAL TiTLe.-The testator devised his residuary estate to the plaintiff in trust
to pay the income among his wife and children; but if the widow elected to take
under the statute of distributions, the trustee was to settle the estate in five years
with division among the beneficiary children. The widow elected to take under
the statute. Ten years later, no division had been made, but the defendant as
judgment creditor attached the interest of one beneficiary in the real estate and
got execution. Plaintiff filed his bill to have this cloud removed from his title.
Held, (three judges dissenting) that the attachment and execution levy should
be vacated. Allen v. Merrill, Lynch & Co. (1923, Mich.) i94 N. W. 131.
Courts have occasionally held that the bare legal title in the trustee becomes
vested in the one entitled without proof of a formal conveyance by the trustee,
on the ground that where the sole remaining duty in the trustee is to convey,
the trust becomes passive and is executed by the Statute of Uses. Glasgow v.
Missouri Car Co. (i91o) 229 Mo. 585, 129 S. W. 900; contra: McFall v. Kirk-
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patrick (i9o8) 236 Ill. 281, 86 N. E. 139. Similarly upon the death of the husband
where property is given in trust for the separate use of a married woman.
Wilson v. Heilman (198o) 219 Pa. 237, 68 Atl. 674. Or, as has been held, the
title may be vested by a presumption that the trustee has performed his duty
and conveyed. Phillips v. Vermeule (1917, Ch.) 88 N. J. Eq. 500; I Perry,
Trusts and Trustees (6th ed. 1911) secs. 349, 351. Again the trustee has been
divested of his title by an implied qualification that when the purposes of the
trust are satisfied his estate ceases to exist and vests in the one entitled to a
conveyance. Cochran v. Hiden (1921) 130 Va. 123, 1O7 S. E. 708. A similar
result is reached in some states by statute. N. Y. Cons. Laws, i99, ch. 52,
sec. iog. The instant case is based on the fact that no accounting has been made
by the plaintiff in his double capacity as executor and trustee. This does not
seem inconsistent with the above authorities. To make an accounting a condi-
tion precedent to the vesting of title seems only to provide the best practical
evidence that no duty remains in the trustee except to convey.
Wnl~s-SoLDInR's NUNCUPATIVE WILL-REQUIREMENT AS TO WITNESSES.-
Before going over the top, the deceased told a comrade that if he were killed
everything he had should go to his fiancee. After being taken prisoner, he made
a similar statement to another comrade. N. Y. Laws, igo, ch. 928, sec. 141
requires proof of a nuncupative will by at least two witnesses. Held, that the
will should be admitted to probate. In re Mason's Will (923, Surro. Ct.)
121 Misc. i42, 2oo N. Y. Supp. 9O1.
Nuncupative wills are generally regarded with disfavor and must strictly
comply with the statutory requirements. Bolles v. Harris (1877) 34 Ohio St.
38; Bundrick v. Haygood '(i8go) io6 N. C. 468, 11 S. E. 423. But this rule has
been relaxed as to oral wills made by soldiers or seamen in actual service. Thus,
it has been held that they need not be made in eztrenmis, nor subsequently reduced
to writing. Ex parte Thompson (1856, N. Y. Surro. Ct.) 4 Bradf. 154; Il. re
O'Connor's Will (igog, Surro. Ct) 65 Misc. 403, i21 N. Y. Supp. 9o3. Nor is
a rogatio testiurm necessary. In re Stable [1919] P. 7. And there is a tendency
to ignore the usual requirement of testamentary intent. Rice v. Freeland (i922,
Va.) iog S. E. 186; but see In re Satar's Estate (1923) 275 Pa. 42o, ng At. 478.
The requirement that the soldier be in actual service has moreover been liberally
construed. Gatward v. Knee [19o2] P. 99 (begins with mobilization); Re
Limond [1915] 2 Ch. 240 (does not end with conclusion of operations). But in
the absence of statute real property cannot be devised by such a will. Pierce v.
Pierce (1874) 46 Ind. 86; Godman v. Godman [1919] P. 229; but see Wills(Soldiers and Sailors) Act (918) 7 & 8 Geo. V, c. 58, sec. 3. It is also doubtful
whether an infant soldier's will is valid. Goodell v. Pike (1867) 40 Vt 3ig(invalid) ; contra: In re Stable, supra; see In re Wernher [1918] I Ch. 339;
COMMENTS (1918) :27 YA.E LAw JouRNAL, 806; (ii8) 28 ibid. 202. Soldiers'
wills may be proved by one witness even though the statute ordinarily requires
two witnesses for other nuncupative dispositions. Gould v. Safford (1866) 39
Vt. 498. Under such statutes it has been held that the testamentary declaration
must be made to both present at the same time. Talley v. Butterworth (1837,
Tenn.) 1o Yerg. 501; Yaritall's Will (1833, Pa.) 4 Rawle, 46. New York
restricts nuncupative wills to soldiers and seamen in actual service. N. Y. Cons.
Laws, 19og, ch. 13, sec. 16. The court in the instant case, following the tendency
of courts to reward the patriotism of soldiers, construed the requirement as to
witnesses liberally. The danger that such a decision opens the door to fraud
was apparently compensated for in the mind of the court by considerations of
public policy.
